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1 In  Ancient  Greece,  during  the  5th century  BCE  a  change  occurred  in  people’s
understanding of the world and themselves that would prove fateful for all of subsequent
history. The world is split, in that each conscious being obtains an excerpt from it as his
private inner world, in which his entire experience is contained and sealed off from the
outside world. Its name is “psyche”, “soul”. At the start of the century, this soul, which
until then was life or the spirit of the dead, still lacked isolation ; Heraclitus says : “You
shall never find the limits of the soul on your wanderings, no matter how many roads you
travel” (Diels & Kranz, 1956, p. 161)1. From Sophocles, in the second half of the century, in
this isolated verse from the lost Manteis, the expression survives : “to open the closed gate
of  the  soul”  (Nauck,  1964,  p. 217).2 The  split  in  the  world  lies  between  these  two
testimonies. The external world that remains between them after taking away all the
inner worlds was even then, with Democritus, and later with Plato and his successors,
pared down to a few characteristic types and their notional bearers. The waste left over
from this paring down is disposed of by transportation into the souls, either deliberately,




are  unexpectedly  accommodated,  in  modified  form,  in  the  souls.  In  this  way,  the
perceptible  felt  body [Leib]  and  corporeal [leiblich]  communication,  the  emotions  as
atmospheres  and  atmospheres  of  other  kinds,  meaningful  impressions  and  other
significant situations, as well as other things are displaced from one’s attention ; what
remain are inner worlds for self-control and an external world for mastery of the world,
first by God, then by humans and their works. 
2 At the same time, belonging to it analogously on top of that, Greek geometry developed as
the first  deductive science,  taking as  its  subject  the space on the area,  in  that  two-
dimensional shapes such as circles,  triangles and conic sections as well  as bodies are
viewed in terms of their surfaces. Since then, the notion of space has assumed, as if it
were self-evident,  that areas exist in space. This notion later matured in the form of
analytical  coordinate geometry which,  with its  nets developed in the area,  spans the
space and creates the schema of a determination of location, as precise as desired. This
fixing on a type of space that contains areas has far-reaching consequences. Areas are
readily accessible, sometimes as smooth surfaces such as the hairless skin of a human
being, sometimes as areas that do not demarcate anything, such as some patches of light.
One needs areas in order to arrive, moving downwards, at lines (as edges) and points (as
corners). Without areas and lines there is no possibility of interpreting solid bodies as
three-dimensional volumes. Without sections, one cannot derive any divisibility from the
extension of bodies. But above all, one needs lines and thus areas in order to introduce
locations which permit one to say where something is.  This introduction of locations
starts out from visual targets which are placed in relation to one another through lines
that join them. In contrast to the direction of gaze, these connecting tracks are reversible,
i.e.  one can always traverse them in the opposite direction. Through this,  it becomes
possible to read off distances and positions from them. With the aid of distances and
positions, it is possible to introduce a system of locations which are mutually determined
by the positions and distances of objects situated on them – a locational space [Ortsraum],
as  I  call  it.  We  have  the  access  to  areas  to  thank  for  all  these  characteristics  and
orientation aids of the space that is familiar to us. 
3 There are, however, also spaces without area. One example is the space of sound. I am
thinking not so much of the signals for direction and distance relating to the source of
the  sound,  but  rather  of  the  space  spanned  by  the  rhythmic  and  tonal  movement
suggestions of the sound, such as piercing noise, diminishing echo, rising and falling,
pressing and circling, everything that jumps from the sound to those who are dancing
and marching, likewise of the synaesthetic mass properties of the sound as a far-reaching,
sonorous resonance of a gong or a shrill, sharp whistle, etc. The sound has volume, but
not a three-dimensional volume, because there are no areas. Very close to it is the area-
less space of the readily remembered silence, which as a ceremonial silence is broad and
dense, as an oppressive silence is close and even denser, as the silence of an untouched
morning is broad and delicate. Other examples are the space of the weather, which one
might experience for example as a loosely filled expanse when emerging from a stifling
room to the outdoors ;  the space of  the unobtrusive backdrop which one continually
claims  through  small  movements  of  straightening  up,  leaning  back,  stretching,  and
through  which  one  hurries  energetically,  dancing  backwards,  because  there  are  no
concerns about two-dimensionally delimited obstacles ; the space of the wind striking you
head on, which is perceived as movement without any change in location if one takes it as




unfolding  gesture,  the  space  of  the  water  for  the  swimmer  who struggles  against  a
resisting  volume that  is  without  areas  or  lines,  but  which has  directions  of  striving
forward or flowing against, or who calmly lets himself be carried by it. Such area-less
spaces are not merely shadow-like side-effects and symptoms of the locational space that
is familiar to us, but are rather its indispensable preconditions, not just psychologically or
anthropologically, but even logically. One can show that a locational space cannot even be
introduced without borrowing something from spaces that are without location, because
they are without area. In the locational space, stillness and movement are defined as
staying in one location and changing location. Furthermore, locations are determined, i.e.
identified, through their position and distance from static objects. For if these objects
were to move, but the identified locations did not move along with them, their positions
and distances from the reference objects would change.  The objects located on them
would thus have changed their location, even if they had remained where they were.
Stillness  and  movement  would  no  longer  be  distinguishable,  and  this  cannot  be.
Determining location thus presupposes that the reference objects are stationary. On the
other  hand,  stillness  in locational  space presupposes  locations,  if  it  is  understood as
remaining  in  one  place.  Stillness  then  presupposes  the  location,  but  the  location
presupposes  stillness,  and  what  arises  is  a  circular  definition  which  thwarts  the
introduction of a locational space if one cannot fall back on an understanding of stillness
that precedes the locational space. Such an understanding is provided by area-less spaces,
e.g. as still water, calm silence, evening repose, resting when tired. One must start out
from such morphic experiences of stillness in order to find reference objects through
which one can set  up a  locational  space with positions and distances ;  in this,  these
reference objects can then be determined themselves by locations, and then secondarily
the stillness of the reference objects can count as remaining at these locations. 
4 The two most important types of area-less spaces are the space of the felt body and the
space of emotions as atmospheres. I define the felt body of a person as the epitome of
everything that he himself can perceive as belonging to himself, in the vicinity – not
always within the boundaries – of his material body [Körper], without making use of the
five  senses  of  sight,  hearing,  touch,  smell,  taste  and  of  the  perceptive  material  body
schema (the habitual image of a person’s own material body) that has been obtained from
his or her experiences, particularly those of sight and touch. These include first of all the
purely corporeal stirrings such as fright, anxiety, pain, hunger, thirst, itching, sharp pains,
disgust, vigour, fatigue ; secondly, the corporeal stirrings which are the affective marks of
emotions, e.g. of joy, sadness, anger, shame, fear, courage, compassion, contentedness,
despair ; thirdly, the perceived voluntary and involuntary movements such as walking,
grasping,  jumping,  dancing,  shivering,  twitching,  swallowing ;  and  fourthly,  the
irreversible corporeal directions, sometimes occurring without movement, as when one
gazes, sometimes  tied  to  movements,  as  in  breathing  out  and  swallowing.  All  these
corporeal events are area-less. One cannot perceive any areas on one’s own felt body. One
can see them and feel them only on one’s own material body. The felt body is usually a
surging of blurred islands, amongst which individual ones stand out through consistency,
structure and function. This includes the island of breathing in the region of the chest or
abdomen.  It  forms itself  anew with every intake of  breath,  through the enfolding of
constricting tension with widening expansion, wherein initially the expansion takes the
lead,  from which the predominance is gradually displaced towards tension,  until  this
threatens to become unbearable and its predominance is carried away via the direction of




felt body island collapses, only to be formed anew shortly after. Through this, one can see
what is a volume without area, and therefore a volume that is not three-dimensional
either,  but  which  is  also  –  through the  enfolding  of  contraction  and  expansion  –  a
dynamic corporeal volume for the vital drive.
5 The vital  drive goes beyond the boundaries of  one’s own felt  body and connects felt
bodies to one another, as well as to incorporeal figures through a common vital drive in
the encorporation [Einleibung] which is either antagonistic (through at least one-sided
attention to a partner) or showing solidarity (without such attention). I shall make do
here with an example of antagonistic encorporation, namely the involuntary ballet that is
enacted on the populated streets of cities when people hurry towards one another in
crowds. Each has in mind only his own objective, for example an intended purchase, and
graces  the  others  with  fleeting,  almost  careless  glances,  but  which  are  nonetheless
sufficient to allow him to pass them without colliding with them, in the course of which
he must take account of the imminent routes of the next person as well  as of those
appearing behind him and alongside, without noticing the position and distance of his
own material body relative to them, and the parts of his material body – feet, shoulders,
arms of his own material body – that are decisive for evasion. This succeeds because the
glances follow on from one another and the movement suggestions (the clear signs of
imminent movement by the oncoming people) transfer into the material body schema of
the motor system which controls expediently integrated movements, whose directions
are  not  –  like  those  of  the  perceptive  material  body schema  –  reversible,  but  are
irreversible.  I  shall  return  to  that.  Encorporation also  exists  in  relation  to  incorporeal
figures, such as a stone or snowball flying towards one, which one skilfully evades like
oncoming people, without taking note of the position and distance of one’s own material
body parts. Such encorporation into something incorporeal is enabled by bridge qualities,
which can be perceived both on one’s own felt body and on figures that one encounters.
Such  bridge  qualities  are  movement  suggestions  and  synesthetic  characteristics.
Synesthetic characteristics are properties which run through all specific senses and often,
but not always, bear the names of specific sensory qualities, but as the breadth, weight
and density of  readily remembered stillness,  they can also make do entirely without
sensory qualities. The gait of a person is a good example of movement suggestions and
synesthetic characteristics which can be sensed on one’s own felt body, just as the gait of
another person can be perceived, for example as nimble, lithe, tense, lively, jaunty or as
soft, ponderous, heavy, shuffling, dragging, ungainly etc.
6 With the  corporeal stirrings,  we encounter  atmospheres  for  the  first  time.  There  are
partial corporeal stirrings that are accommodated on individual islands of the felt body,
such as headache, stomach ache or tired legs. There are also holistic corporeal stirrings,
such as a climate into which the whole felt  body is immersed, without distribution to
islands.  Scheler  (1954,  p. 350-354)  spoke of  feelings  of  being  alive [Lebensgefühle].  One
example is weariness, which is different from fatigue. Fatigue can be holistic or partial,
but weariness is only holistic. Fatigue requires rest, and is satisfied by it. Weariness is
alleviated as little by rest as it is by movement ; it is a sensitive weakening of vitality
without regard to the movement status of the felt body. Another example is the holistic
pleasure  experienced when lazing in  the  sun or  in  the  bath.  That  which is  called a
person’s form on the day belongs here just as the gradual, easily disrupted process of
livening  up  experienced  by  many  people  in  the  mornings  –  the  so-called  morning




of  the  felt  body.  The  meaning  of  the  word  “atmosphere”  in  the  most  general
interpretation that is necessary for the phenomenology of spatiality can be expressed
thus : an atmosphere is a total or partial, but in any case comprehensive, occupation of an
area-less space in the sphere of that which is experienced as being present. I speak of
“occupation” rather than filling, so that an atmosphere of emptiness can be taken into
account also. With “comprehensive”, I wish to indicate that it is not just individual points
that  are  occupied,  but  extended  fields,  in  which  many  points  are  accommodated.
Nevertheless,  not  every  such  atmosphere  needs  to  occupy  totally  the  space  of
experienced  presence,  or  even  to  claim  this.  This  is  not  the  case  with  corporeal
atmospheres,  what  Scheler  calls  feelings  of  being alive.  The weariness  of  a  felt  body is
compatible with surroundings that are bursting with vitality. The pleasure experienced in
the bath or a warm room does not extend beyond their margins ; it may be bitterly cold
outside. In this respect, atmospheres of the felt body differ from atmospheres of emotion.
Besides corporeal pleasure, there is a pleasure as an emotion, for example the feeling of
being secure in the love of a person, or of a harmonious family circle. For this, one does
not need a bathtub or a warm room ; it is everywhere one goes, borderless in the space of
experienced presence.
7 That atmospheres of emotion fill the area-less space of experienced presence entirely, or
at least claim to fill it, I shall demonstrate by the social contrast of emotions. To this end,
I shall compare two emotions, joy and sorrow, with two merely corporeal stirrings, vigour
and weariness. Joy and vigour, sorrow and weariness are related ; joy can be felt with
vigour, and sorrow with weariness. I now imagine that a person who is feeling joyful finds
himself inadvertently in the company of deeply sorrowful people who are immersed in
their sorrow. Given a certain amount of sensitivity, he will dampen the lively expression
of his joy somewhat, and perhaps even hold it back modestly, and retreat. His behaviour
will turn out to be different if he, as a person full of vigour, finds himself in the company
of  weary people.  If  he  wants  something from them,  he  will  not  allow himself  to  be
subdued by them, but will attempt to stir the weary people by appealing to them or even
grabbing them, and if he does not achieve anything, he will more likely be prepared to
actively help them, by offering them refreshment or calling a doctor, and so on. This
difference in the degree of contrast requires explanation. The respect for human dignity
is not sufficient here. It would benefit both the weary and the sorrowful people, and
rather lead to grasping hold of them, in order to raise them up and thus give them back
their attitude of pride and dignity. A stronger inhibition is necessary, one that outweighs
the  respect  for  human  dignity,  in  order  to  prompt  the  joyful  person  to  leave  the
sorrowful people alone. This can only be the authority of sorrow itself, of an atmosphere
that emanates from the people who are immersed in it, which makes the claim to occupy
the space of experienced presence entirely, and with the strength of this claim defeats
the claim of joyfulness, which in this situation is equal but carries less weight. Weariness,
on the other hand, does not make such a claim, since the merely corporeal stirrings, even
as holistic ones, form atmospheres that are delimited in the surroundings, and nor do
they have the authority of emotions.
8 Since the split  in the world that occurred in the fifth century BCE,  we have become
accustomed to categorising the emotions as passiones animae, affects or passions of the
soul, and to assign them to the closed, private inner world of the conscious being – in
contrast  to  Empedocles  who,  still  in those  times,  claimed  to  be  the  first  to  have




implanted in the limbs of mortals, works towards them harbouring friendly attitudes and
performing peaceable works.3 The introjection of the emotions to which the humanity of
classical Greek philosophy around the time of Plato and Aristotle subscribed is an error ;
it already fails through the fact that the soul, or whatever one wishes to call a closed
private inner world of  all  experience that  is  introjected into it,  does not  exist,  as  is
demonstrated in particular by the fact that the relationship of the conscious being to his
soul  cannot  be  conclusively  constructed  (Schmitz  2009,  p. 29-45 ;  2010,  p. 145-163).
Emotions  are  atmospheres  in  an  area-less  space  which  can  be  congruent  with  the
locational space that covers an area, just like the area-less spaces of sound and silence,
but which is also capable of extending beyond that. The atmospheres of emotion are
either merely perceived, or they move one in a corporeally perceptible way ; in this case,
they are felt in affective impingement, as the emotions that one has oneself.
9 The area-less emotional space has three layers. The base layer is formed by the pure
moods, which with mere breadth, but still without direction, underpin all other emotions.
There are two pure moods : contentedness and despair. Despair is the mood of emptiness,
like the acedia of the Desert Fathers, like the ennui of the French, a boredom that is mixed
with disgust. It is sometimes formed by reflection on the meaningless nature of life and
activity, but in other cases it can also arise spontaneously, for example in an unsettlingly
pale and cool evening twilight, or on a cold, wet November morning in the ugly sea of
houses of a big city,  or on a railway station. It is oppressive, but not depressing like
sorrow, but anchorless, a falling into emptiness. The opposite mood, contentedness, is the
sense of being sustained by a dense wealth of emotion, such as the sense of feeling secure
in the love of  a  person or a harmonious family circle,  or in calm,  not arrogant,  but
composed self-confidence. The second layer consists of pure stimuli ; these are emotions
whose atmosphere is pervaded by directions, but is not centred on a theme. These include
abstract joy and melancholy, apprehension and longing, discontent and mistrust, which
are  just  looking  for  triggers,  and  are  characterised  by  presentiment,  a  sense  of
anticipation. The third layer is formed by the thematically centred emotions, in which
the directed stimuli are pulled together around a theme. They are often passed off as
intentional emotions, related to an object, and are then also often taken to be actual
emotions, but this characterisation is not sufficient, since talk of the object of an emotion
is  mostly  ambiguous,  namely  when  the  thematic  centre  is  split  into  the  area  of
condensing and the point of anchorage. Thus joy about something, namely a point of
anchorage for the joy, such as success at work, is different from joy of something, an area
of condensing, for example joy of a beautiful landscape, which one does not experience
joy about. In the case of a murderous attack, the area of condensing is the fear of the
attackers, and the point of anchorage is death. If, in a preliminary form of fear without a
point of anchorage,  the area of condensing is experienced with corporeal anxiety,  the
result is horror, which is rounded off into fear when a point of anchorage is added. 
10 In addition to the emotions as atmospheres with the tendency to total expansion in the
space of experienced presence, there are also other such atmospheres which are not, or
not always, emotions. The most obvious example is the weather, as it is actually given to
human perception and sensing,  and which still  forms the most  obvious substance of
conversation between strangers,  in  other  words  before  any  constructive  attempts  at
division into a physical and a psychological part. Another example is stillness, either on a
broad plain or at night. Weather and stillness can be emotions, for example as cheerfully




emotionally  charged  nature  is  missing.  The  difference  lies  in  the  way  in  which  the
atmospheres  become corporeally tangible.  The  affective  impact  of  emotions  is  feeling
moved,  in the sense that this feeling of  being affected only then becomes one’s own
genuine feeling of the emotion when the affected person first of all goes along with the
stimulus that the feeling gives him, and only subsequently has the opportunity to deal
with it through surrender or resistance. By contrast, whoever welcomes the feeling, right
at the threshold of its entry into being affected in a corporeally affective way, with a
ready-made stance, will either only be graced with a fleeting trace and will not be moved
by it, or he will just act as if he felt and were moved by the emotion. In the case of the
mere corporeal stirrings and the totally space-filling atmospheres which are not emotions,
this sequence does not apply. A weather which is not an emotion can certainly have a
corporeally affective impact, so that for example one curses it and wishes for rain instead,
or conversely for dry conditions, but one cannot speak here of being moved by it, which
would be genuine only if one were first of all to go along with a stimulus provided by the
weather and only afterwards had the opportunity to deal with it through surrender or
resistance.
11 In area-less spaces one can live and orientate oneself without requiring an area. All one
needs for this is a web of directions of various kinds, which I now intend to categorise. In
first position are the corporeal directions, which are indivisibly extended and which lead
irreversibly from constriction to broadness. Of these, the gaze and the directions of the
material body schema for the motor system are important for orientation. Apart from the
perceptive  material  body schema,  which  is  organised  at  the  level  of  locational  space
through positions and distances via reversible connections, the human being (like the
animal) has a material body schema for the motor system, which for example steps into
action if, in the case of itching or burning on the skin, the dominant hand, without being
located according to distance and position, is led directly and surely to the irritated point
on the skin, in order to brush off or crush the parasite that is anticipated to be there. The
material body schema for the motor system, which directs all the expediently coordinated
movements of the material body, is based on irreversible directions, which call up the
material  body parts  that  are relevant for the movement in the precisely determined
vicinity and distance, but cannot be reversed in order, starting out from the material
body parts, to find the reference point from which, for example, the right hand is always
on the right, the foot is always further away than the knee. The gaze is itself one of the
directions of the material body schema for the motor system, which - independently of
the gaze, for example - direct the gestures and the changes of stance and displacement of
weight  when  balancing  to  intercept  an  impending  fall,  but  which  likewise  interact
directly with the gaze, for example in the case of skilful evasion. The second type of
likewise  irreversible  directions  consists  in  the  movement  suggestions  of  figures
encountering each other, with which the material body schema for the motor system
cooperates under the direction of the gaze, for example when people have to get past one
another without colliding on densely populated pavements ; I have mentioned this above.
The concerto of emanating corporeal directions and incoming movement suggestions is
sufficient  for  the  motor  orientation  in  corporeal communication  even  without
consideration of areas and everything which, like positions and distances, depends on
areas via reversible connections. I doubt whether animals even notice areas, and not just,




12 The  complete  directional  space,  which  underlies  the  extended  locational  space,  also
includes,  besides  the  corporeal directions  and  the  movement  suggestions  of  figures
encountering each other, irreversible directions of a third type : the cryptic directions.
Both corporeal directions and oncoming movement suggestions have a definable source,
even if this cannot be located precisely. Even the merely acoustic movement suggestions
originate from a sound source.  By cryptic  directions I  mean directions for which no
source can be found. An example is the overpowering gravity that affects a person when
he slips and falls, or barely manages to save himself. It comes as an outside force, as an
attack from the void,  over the felt  body,  to which it  does not belong,  although it  is
perceptible only on that body itself, not as the work of an external cause, and pulls it
downwards along with the material body, although the affected person resists vigorously.
Similarly cryptic are the directions of the moving emotions. I shall single out only anger.
It resembles the overpowering gravity in that without a visible source, it impinges on the
felt body with a considerable movement stimulus, which tends to lead forwards rather
than downwards. One cannot consider, as the source, for example the object about which
one is angry, with an area of condensing and a point of anchorage, for the anger does not
come over one from there, but is directed in the reverse direction, against it. The sense of
being seized is similar in both cases, but the behaviour in response is opposed. Whereas
the person who slips and falls resists from the start, the angry person allows himself to be
carried along with it, at least in an initial phase, and places his own impulse in the service
of the anger, until he faces it with either surrender or resistance, and deals with it. 
13 Everything about the human motor system that is spontaneous, fluid and involuntary,
including the gestures, which are introduced spontaneously from cryptically impinging
feelings and which are mostly complicated and difficult to learn, plays out in the concerto
of the irreversible directions of the directional space with these three types : the corporeal
directions,  the  oncoming  movement  suggestions  and  the  cryptic  directions  of  the
emotions. All movements would become incredibly laborious and inhibited, devoid of any
fluidity,  if  they had to be measured in locational  space with positions and distances.
Animals never get beyond directional space. Humans succeed in constructing a form of
space of a quite different type over this, in that they are capable of recording individual
targets of gazing, connecting these on surfaces through lines with reversible directions,
and reading off from these connections positions and distances, with the aid of which
steadfast locations can be introduced which allow one to say where something is, and if
applicable  allow its  movement  from one  place  to  another  to  be  followed.  It  is  only
through this that it becomes possible to store objects successively at locations, such that
first  one,  then another  object  was  located there.  The locational  space with all  these
achievements does not, however, take the place of directional space, but merely reshapes
it and constantly relates back to it. Without fundamental directional space, there is no
locational space. I have shown that this is in fact logically correct. On the other hand,
everything that takes place in directional space can be translated into locational space.
The result of the successful synthesis of these two forms of space is optical space. It can
subside to the level of mere directional space, for example as in the spontaneous response
of skilful evasion of a powerful mass seen approaching imminently. For one does not then
think  of  locations  determined  by  position  and  distance,  but  takes  in  the  movement
suggestion that indicates the imminent course of the mass, via a glance into the material
body schema for the motor system, which adjusts one’s own movement to the need for




space, but is inserted into a directional structure, adapted to the material body schema for
the motor system, of looking attention.4 By contrast, the area-less space of sound does not
get  beyond  the  directional  space,  but  it  can  be  stored  in  the  locational  space  and
secondarily visualised in the imagination, in that one orientates oneself towards sources
of sound. Something similar applies to the space of emotions. However, it cannot be fully
stored in the locational space. Many atmospheres of emotion become apparent optically,
acoustically or in imagined images of recollection or fantasy, often as atmospheres that
are merely perceived or that only fleetingly touch one, even before they move one, but
there are also emotions that one never sees or hears, not even when visualising them, and
which nonetheless move one in a corporeally tangible way, such as when without any
discernible cause, one is overcome by a sense of happiness or sinks into melancholy or
despair.5 The  capacity  for  atmospheres  to  be  introduced  into  locational  space  does
however  go  so  far  that  the  person  can  prepare  his  own  emotional  space  from  the
emotions that have been made available to him thus at particular locations. That is what
is achieved by dwelling, with which I wish to conclude this description.
14 Dwelling is more than satisfying physical needs through walls to protect against wind and
weather, namely the art of capturing atmospheres which are emotions and designing
them such that the person can attune to them in harmony with his corporeal mood. Since
they, as has been shown, are aimed at claiming totally the space of experienced presence
with area-less occupation, for the purpose of dwelling, in the first instance such a space
must be delimited, so that they do not escape from the person’s control. This purpose is
served by the enclosing which separates the home from that which is outside, but which
belongs with it as a contrast. Dwelling is cultivation of the emotions in an enclosed space
(Schmitz 2005, p. 258-308). This definition applies not only to the domestic residence, but
also to domiciles in the wider sense, such as the Christian church (as an interior space)
and the  garden.  The  shaping  of  emotions  in  an  enclosed  space  takes  place  through
movement suggestions and synesthetic characteristics. These are bridge qualities, which
can both be sensed on one’s own felt body and perceived in figures. On account of this
proximity to the felt body, emotions settle on such figures that are endowed with such
bridge qualities just as they move felt bodies, naturally without such figures having to feel
anything because of that. Thus figures, even if they are incorporeal, become bearers of
atmospheres of emotion, and these atmospheres become apparent via them, and at the
same  time  these  bearers  become  partners  in  the  common  drive  of  antagonistic
encorporation, even if they themselves cannot feel anything, as for example when someone
falls in love with a picture and is connected to it through the common drive, although the
picture cannot feel anything. The encorporation allows the emotion that is perceived via
the  figure  to  be  possessed,  as  his  own  emotion,  by  the  conscious  being  that  is
communicating corporeally. One example : the gentle, questioning call of “hello” coming
from behind, from the writer Bertolt Brecht, who up to that point was unknown to the
hearer, rendered the young married journalist Ruth Berlau erotically obedient to him
over  the  long-term,  and  to  her  misfortune.  She  writes  about  it  thus :  “This  gentle,
questioning call  has,  as  I  later discovered,  for many women become so to speak the
content of their lives. That is what they waited for, that is what they built on, and that is
what they dreamed of” (Schmitz 2005b, p. 477).6 Brecht knew how to strike a note whose
synaesthetic character was saturated with emotions, to which the dispositions of the felt
bodies of the women whom he wanted to seduce were so attuned that, on account of the




15 In  a  comparable  but  more  harmless  way,  the  use  of  movement  suggestions  and
synaesthetic  characteristics  on  suitably  designed  objects  leads  to  the  formation  of
atmospheres  of  emotion in  the  enclosed space  of  a  home,  and to  the  tuning of  the
occupants and/or visitors into these atmospheres. This applies to the church space and
the garden as well as to the domestic home. In this latter, the living room in particular is
appointed for such cultivation of emotions which, according to the taste of the designing
occupant,  cultivates  or  subdues  atmospheres  through  movement  suggestions  and
synaesthetic characteristics in such a way that an emotional climate of the desired type is
created.  This includes the design of  the walls,  the ceiling and the floor (left  bare or
covered with carpet), as well as the furnishing and control of incoming light, temperature
and sounds. In the living room, one receives one’s guests, in order to demonstrate to
them one’s own solution to this task.
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The article  develops  a  fundamental  conception of  atmospheres  which is  incorporated into  a
phenomenology of the felt body [Leib]. It builds on a critique of a splitting of the world into a
private inner world as the location of experience and of emotions, and an external world that is
separated  off  from  that  –  a  split  already  made  in  antiquity.  Set  against  this  notion  is  the
conception of the felt body as space without area. What is meant by the felt body is what one can
sense as belonging to oneself without recourse to the five senses. Atmospheres represent another
category of spaces without area. They are regarded as a total or partial occupation of a space
without area in that sphere that is  experienced as being present.  A distinction is made here
between atmospheres of the felt body, atmospheres of emotion, and those atmospheres that are
not emotions.  The example of  living [in the sense of  dwelling] is  used to clarify how people
achieve their own space of emotion from the atmospheres of emotion available at places.
Cet article développe un concept d'ambiances, qui fait partie d'une phénoménologie du corps vécu
[Leib]. Il se fonde sur une critique de la séparation du monde, déjà effectué dans l’antiquité, entre
un monde intérieur privé comme lieu d’expériences et d’émotions et un monde extérieur. À cette
idée il oppose une conception du corps vécu comme espace sans surfaces. Il associe le corps vécu à
ce que l'on peut sentir comme appartenant à lui-même, sans utiliser les cinq sens. Des ambiances
sont une autre catégorie d’espaces sans surfaces. Elles sont considérées comme une occupation
totale ou partielle d'un espace sans surfaces dans la zone, qui est vécue comme présente. Une
distinction est faite entre des atmosphères du corps vécu, des ambiances de l’émotion et de telles
atmosphères, qui ne sont pas des émotions. En utilisant l'exemple de l’habiter il montre comment
les  êtres  humains  se  créent  leur  propre  espace  émotionnel  en  partant  des  ambiances
émotionnelles disponibles á ces lieux. 
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